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Abstract Research has shown that children usually provide
teleological explanations for the features of organisms and
artifacts, from a very early age (3–4 years old). However,
there is no consensus on whether teleological explanations
are given in the same manner for non-living natural objects
as well. The present study aimed to document the teleolog-
ical explanations of 5- to 8-year-old children for particular
features (color and shape) of organisms, artifacts and non-
living natural objects. In addition, it was examined if there
was any correlation between these explanations and child-
ren’s explanations for the usefulness of those features. Our
results indicate a developmental shift in children’s teleolog-
ical explanations, from a non-selective teleology in pre-
school to a selective one in the second grade. In the latter
case, children provided teleological explanations mostly for
the shape of the feet of organisms and for the shape of
artifacts, whereas pre-school children provided teleological
explanations for non-living natural objects as well, both for
the color and for the shape in all cases. Our results are not
conclusive and further research is required, including a
larger spectrum of students, since teleology is one of the
most important conceptual obstacles in understanding evo-
lution that persists even into adulthood. We conclude by
proposing a particular research program for this purpose.
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Introduction
Evolutionary theory is the central, unifying theory of biolo-
gy. It explains the unity of life by documenting how extant
and extinct species share a common ancestry. It also
explains the diversity of life by describing how particular
species have evolved from ancestral ones through natural
processes. Charles Darwin laid the foundations of current
evolutionary theory in 1859, in his book On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection where he argued for
the common ancestry of all life and proposed natural selec-
tion as the mechanism by which evolution proceeds (Darwin
1859). However, evolutionary biology has itself evolved
since then as it incorporated advances in genetics, paleon-
tology, and systematics (Huxley 1942), and later in other
fields like developmental biology, molecular biology, and
genomics (Pigliucci and Muller 2010). Evolution is current-
ly considered a fact of life by scientists. An evolutionary
perspective is dominant in many of the most active fields of
biological research, such as comparative genomics and evo-
lutionary developmental biology. Consequently, the teach-
ing of evolution in biology courses provides students with a
unifying, explanatory principle that organizes their under-
standing of life.
This notwithstanding, the idea of evolution has been
debated enormously in the public domain. Various polls
have shown that there is a low public understanding, and
consequently acceptance, of evolution (see for example
Miller et al. 2006). This low public acceptance is usually
related to creationism (Intelligent Design being its most
recent version—see Numbers 2006), and to the attempt to
introduce an alternative, religiously founded, explanation
for the origin of species in biology courses (Branch and
Scott 2009). However, neither creationism nor Intelligent
Design exhibits the necessary prerequisites for inclusion
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in the biology curriculum (Sober 2007; Audi 2009). Al-
though creationism is certainly prevalent in the U.S. it is
by no means only found there (Curry 2009; Graebsch and
Schiermeier 2006; Hameed 2008; Numbers 2009).
However, resistance to evolution may not only be due to
its perceived conflict with religious beliefs and personal
worldviews. Resistance to scientific theories may be due to
intuitions that arise in childhood and persist into adulthood,
to generate preconceptions about the natural world and often
make scientific findings seem unnatural and counterintuitive
(Bloom and Weisberg 2007). It seems that particular pre-
conceptions relevant to biology are never completely over-
written, despite significant understanding of biological
processes or expert scientific knowledge (Goldberg and
Thompson-Schill 2009). Some of the most usual preconcep-
tions about evolution are related to teleology (for an over-
view and a developmental perspective see Evans 2008).
Teleology is a mode of explanation in which a phenomenon
is explained in terms of a final end or goal (telos) to which it
contributes (Ariew 2007; Walsh 2008). In teleological
explanations, a feature exists or a phenomenon is taking
place in order to make something else possible. For exam-
ple, the fact that birds have wings can be explained in
teleological terms by their function: birds have wings for
flying. Therefore, people who oppose evolution may not
simply reject it because it conflicts with their religious
beliefs and worldviews. Some (or many) of them may reject
it because they do not understand it. In other words, the
conflict may not only be between evolution and religious
views but between evolution and teleological intuitions that
make the theory of evolution seem counterintuitive.
Since evolution instruction in secondary and post-
secondary education has been moderately effective (see
Smith 2010 for a review), we suggest that evolution educa-
tion research should focus on elementary science instruc-
tion. We believe that the study of elementary children's
preconceptions, related to particular conceptual obstacles
like teleology, may contribute to a better understanding of
the resistance to the theory of evolution. In other words,
secondary evolution instruction might be more effective if
children's evolution-related preconceptions (like teleological
ones) were diagnosed and addressed during elementary
school. Rather than being viewed as an undesirable stage
in their conceptual development, children's preconceptions
actually are a necessary step (Carey 2000). If teachers ne-
glect them, or are unaware of them because they are not
always expressed, children's misunderstandings may be-
come stronger as they grow up, despite the knowledge about
science they acquire at school. But contrary to other authors
in this journal (Chanet and Lusignan 2009; Hermann 2011),
we suggest that the problem is not whether and how evolu-
tion by natural selection should be taught in elementary
schools. The main problem in understanding evolution is
students' teleological intuitions (see González Galli and
Meinardi 2011 in this journal). Thus, we studied young
children's intuitive explanations for the features of organ-
isms, artifacts, and non-living natural objects.1 Our research
addresses the problem of resistance to evolution from a
developmental–psychological perspective (not political)
and with a focus on a different age group than usual (ele-
mentary rather than secondary or post-secondary).
Theoretical Background
Developmental evidence suggests that there are distinct
stages in children's perception of evolution-related phenom-
ena. It seems that five- to seven-year-olds tend to think that
animals are eternal and unchanging, and that they cannot
undergo radical changes during their lifetime. On the other
hand, eight- to nine-year-olds are more likely to accept
developmental and intra-species variation but are less likely
than older children to accept common descent. They also
realize that species are not eternal because at this age they
begin to understand death. In addition, they tend to endorse
creationist ideas. Finally, ten- to twelve-year-olds are more
likely to accept the notion that one species may have
descended from an entirely different one, and eventually to
accept the idea of common descent for animals, but not
always for humans (Evans 2008, p.281–282).
Explicit evolution instruction is usually taking place for
the first time in secondary settings. Several studies in the
past have documented that secondary students tend to intu-
itively provide teleological explanations for the existence of
biological traits. It should be noted that in several of these
studies, students' preconceptions have been characterized as
Lamarckian, but this characterization does not adequately
describe their (predominantly teleological) intuitive explan-
ations (for an overview see Kampourakis and Zogza 2007).
Moreover, few studies have examined students' teleological
explanations in detail (Southerland et al. 2001; Kampourakis
and Zogza 2008). Teleological explanations are not restricted
to biology but may be given for chemical phenomena, as
students may think that the behavior of a system is driven by
intrinsic purposes (Talanquer 2007). For example, high
school students may consider that atoms react in order
to form molecules because they need to achieve a full
outer shell to be a sufficient explanation for chemical
reactions (Taber and Watts 1996). Similarly, physics high
school students may believe that they can predict which
of the objects would be hotter than the others by
1 Non-living natural objects are all objects that exist in nature which
are not alive (contrary to organisms) and which have emerged through
natural processes (and are not made by humans, as artifacts are).
Rocks, and clouds are such non-living natural objects. Hereafter, we
will refer to these simply as natural objects.
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considering the basis of their intended use and not the
properties of their structure (Harrison et al. 1999). In
another study, children of four to five years old said that
things fell because they had to, that the sun and moon
did not fall because they had to give light, and that the clouds
did not fall because they had to give rain (Bar et al. 1994).
Evidence from conceptual development research sug-
gests that children tend to provide teleological explanations
for the features of organisms and artifacts from very early in
childhood (three to four years old). According to Keil,
teleological explanations are given for organisms and arti-
facts. When children consider the natural world, they pro-
vide teleological explanations for the properties of
organisms but not for natural objects, such as mountains.
In a study, pre-school and second-grade children were
shown either an emerald or a plant and were asked to choose
between two explanations for the object's green appearance:
a teleological explanation (e.g., they are green because it
helps more of them to survive) and a physical explanation
(e.g., they are green because tiny parts mix together to give
them a green color). Both pre-school and second-grade
children preferred teleological explanations for plants and
physical explanations for emeralds (Keil 1992, p.129–130).
Keil has also suggested that although they tend to provide
teleological explanations both for organisms and for arti-
facts, they are nevertheless able to distinguish organisms
from artifacts due to two main differences between them.
First, the properties of organisms serve the organisms them-
selves, whereas the properties of artifacts serve the purposes
of the agents who use them. For example, roses have thorns
to keep animals from getting at them, whereas barbed wire
has barbs to prevent animals from accessing something
valuable to humans. The second main difference is that
organisms are perceived to have clearer essences than arti-
facts. This may stem from the fact that the way in which
causal relations link properties together and explain their
presence in organisms is clearer (Keil 1994, p.248–249).
Hereafter, we will refer to this view, according to which
teleology is used selectively for organisms and artifacts, as
selective teleology.
On the other hand, according to Kelemen, teleological
explanations are given for organisms, artifacts, and natural
objects. Kelemen has suggested that the bias toward view-
ing objects as made for some purpose derives from an early
sensitivity to intentional agents as object makers and users.
Consequently, from the age of three to four years old
children understand that agents act on the basis of goals
and use objects in order to achieve them. This early aware-
ness of intentional use of objects might influence children's
explanations, particularly as most of the objects in their
environment are artifacts, whose presence is explained by
the way agents use them in order to achieve their own
goals. Such experiences may eventually contribute to
children's tendency to provide teleological explanations
for all kinds of phenomena in the absence of other alterna-
tive explanations (Kelemen 1999a). In a study, four- and
five-year-old children attributed functions not only to clocks
and pockets, but also to non-living natural objects, such as
mountains (for climbing) and clouds (for raining) as well as to
organisms, such as babies (for loving) and to animals (for
walking around), even though they were explicitly given the
option of saying that they were not for anything (Kelemen
1999b). In another study, it was found that first-, second-, and
fourth-grade children explained both animal properties, such
as long necks, and non-biological natural properties, such as
pointy rocks, in teleological terms (Kelemen 1999c). Hereaf-
ter, we will refer to this view, according to which teleology is
used for organisms, artifacts, and natural objects as non-selec-
tive teleology.
More recent studies have not made clear whether child-
ren's teleology is selective or non-selective. For example, it
has been suggested that five- and six-year-old children think
that organisms, artifacts, and natural objects have functions.
However, they perceive function as more central to artifacts
than to natural entities (DiYanni and Kelemen 2005). On the
other hand, it has been suggested that pre-school children
clearly distinguish between organisms and artifacts, as they
identify artifacts in terms of functions, while they identify
animals in terms of appropriate biological characteristics
(Greif et al. 2006).
Based on all the above, in our study we investigated pre-
school (five to six years old), first-grade (six to seven years
old), and second-grade (seven to eight years old) children's
teleological explanations for the features of organisms, arti-
facts, and natural objects. Our major research questions
were the following:
& Are there any between-group and within-group differ-
ences in the number of teleological explanations for
organisms, artifacts, and natural objects that pre-
school, first-grade, and second-grade children give?
& Do children provide more teleological explanations for
the objects with which they are more familiar?
& Do children who provide teleological explanations ex-
plicitly correlate them with a perceived usefulness?
Method
The Research Instrument
In the studies of Keil and Kelemen discussed above, chil-
dren most times had to choose between particular pre-
determined answers to the questions asked. We consider this
a major limitation of these studies; not only because children
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were not free to express their own views, but also because
the answers among which they had to choose might have
influenced them in various ways, i.e., made them select
those answers that seemed to be more “correct” and not
the ones that were actually closer to their own views (if
there were any). We believe that children should be facili-
tated to express their own views and be given the option not
to provide any answer at all instead of being guided to select
one answer out of a predetermined set. Thus, we developed
a questionnaire which included open-ended questions only.
The questions referred to three pairs of pictures shown to
children featuring six items (two organisms, two artifacts,
and two natural objects). In each pair, one item was familiar
to children (duck, scissors and rock) and the other one was
unfamiliar (booby, nutcracker, and stalagmite). The items
were presented in the following order: duck, scissors, rock,
booby, nutcracker, and stalagmite. Most importantly, chil-
dren were explicitly told that there were no correct or wrong
answers and they were also given the option to answer that
they “do not know.” We thus expected to document child-
ren's intuitive answers and explanations. To achieve this, we
asked two distinct types of questions. These questions re-
ferred to artifacts and natural objects as wholes. Based on
the conclusions from Greif et al. (2006), we asked these
questions specifically for the feet of the two organisms, as
students tend to provide teleological explanations not for
whole organisms but for their parts.
The first type of questions served to document children's
explanations, and to examine whether some of these were
teleological. These questions had the form “Why does it
have this feature?” and referred to the color and the shape
of the feet of the duck and the booby, as well as to the color
and the shape of the scissors, the nutcracker, the rock, and
the stalagmite. These questions actually require causal
explanations. Given that one can perceive three types of
causes (ultimate, proximate, final) there are three possible
types of explanations (evolutionary, proximate, teleologi-
cal; for a more detailed analysis see Mayr 1961; Ariew
2003; Kampourakis and Zogza 2008). For example, the
webbed feet of ducks can be explained in three different
ways: (a) these ducks are descended from an ancestral
species in which this feature (webbed feet) first emerged
(ultimate or evolutionary explanation), (b) each foot has its
shape because of particular genes which are expressed
within the cells it consists of (proximate explanation),
and (c) feet are webbed in order to facilitate ducks in
swimming (teleological explanation). Although evolution-
ary explanations are the appropriate type of explanations to
“Why?” questions (proximate explanations are answers to
“How?” questions), teleological explanations are often
given to “Why?” questions as well.
The second set of questions had the form “Is this feature
useful for something?” and were used to let us conclude if
teleological explanations were given by children in order to
refer to a particular function or role or if they unconsciously
used teleological language without having any function or
role in mind. In other words, it was interesting to examine
how many of those children who had provided teleological
explanations, were really expressing their teleological intu-
itions and did not simply use expressions such as “in order
to…” etc. A student who would provide an “in order to”
explanation to a “Why?” question and then would describe
why the respective feature was useful, would have explicitly
expressed his/her teleological intuitions.
Participants
The study took place at a private school in Athens, Greece.
According to Carey, important shifts in children's intuitive
theories take place during the ages of five to seven (Carey
1985). The study involved 74 pre-school children (five to
six years old), 153 first-grade children (six to seven years
old) and 149 second-grade children (seven to eight years
old). The pre-school children were divided into five classes
of approximately 15 children. The first and the second
graders were divided into six classes (for each grade) of
approximately 25 children. The study was designed to be
part of a regular course on Natural Sciences taught in all
grades which is included in the national curriculum.
Data Collection
The study was conducted separately for each group. The
pre-school study lasted from February to May 2010, the
first-grade study lasted from February to March 2010 and
the second-grade study was completed within four days
during March 2010. The data collection process differed in
the pre-school group from the first-grade and the second-
grade groups. The pre-school research protocol was the
following: Each child was separately interviewed by a tester
and a scorer. We decided not to audiotape children's answers
as we were afraid that the audio-recorder would make them
feel nervous. Thus, the tester performed the interview and
kept notes, while the scorer also kept back up notes of
students' answers. The average duration of the interviews,
which took place in the children's classroom during the
regular class period with their nursery teacher, was
15 minutes. Each interview begun with the following state-
ment by the tester “We are going to play a game. At the
beginning, we will show you some pictures and then we will
ask you questions about these pictures. You will probably
not be familiar with all of the objects depicted on the
pictures. You are not supposed to know the answers to all
questions, so the answer ‘I don’t know’ is acceptable. Please
feel free to share with us everything that comes in your
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mind.” The interview consisted of open-ended questions
about the six items. The pictures of the items were shown
to children on A3 printouts. The pictures of the familiar
items (duck, scissors, and rock) were shown first, followed
by those of the unfamiliar ones (booby, nutcracker, and
stalagmite). We refrained from presenting the members of
the same pair consecutively (e.g., the booby right after the
duck) to children because we did not want them to provide
the same type of explanation just because the consecutive
objects had some similarities.
The research protocol followed for the first-grade and the
second-grade groups was the following: a researcher and the
teacher of each class collected the data. The same researcher
was present in all classes of the same grade (six first-grade
classes and six second-grade classes). Teachers were present
during the data collection because we wanted children to
feel comfortable and not to be anxious that they were being
assessed by unfamiliar people. Children were not inter-
viewed as in the preschool group. Being able to write, they
were given a printout of the questionnaire. All children were
given the same handouts, consisting of a six-page pack of
black-and-white copies. Each page contained questions for a
particular item. The pictures used during the interviews of
the preschool group, were also used for the first- and
second-grade groups and they were presented in the same
order. The items were shown to children on two identical A3
printouts; one was attached on the blackboard and the other
was brought to children upon request. Children were asked
to have a look at the printouts and then to silently write
down the answers to all questions. No further instructions
were given to children, apart from the initial ones which
were the following: “You will be asked questions about
organisms, artifacts and natural objects. We will show you
some pictures and you will have to answer the questions
included in the questionnaire. You are not supposed to know
the answers to all questions. This is not a formal assess-
ment; you will not get any credit for this. This is simply a
process of collecting your thoughts, so please feel free to
write down your thoughts and beliefs and do not hesitate to
write that you do not know the answer to a question.” Then
children were given time to complete the questionnaire. The
whole process of data collection varied in time. First-grade
children completed the questionnaire within four class peri-
ods (45 minutes each), whereas second-grade children com-
pleted it within one class period.
We should note at this point that we are aware of the
limitations of using a pencil-and-paper questionnaire with
first-grade and second-grade groups. Studies with children
of this age are usually performed with interviews. These
certainly allow for a more detailed documentation of stu-
dents’ explanations and a deeper understanding of their
thoughts, compared to the written questionnaire. However,
by using written questionnaires, we managed to collect data
from 153 first-grade children within a month and from 149
second-grade children within four days. This ensured that all
children had been taught pretty much the same topics and
concepts when they completed the questionnaires and that
any differences observed would not be due to different
content knowledge. We also consider the fact that these
children were indeed able to complete the six-page ques-
tionnaire an interesting finding itself.
Data Analysis
Children's explanations for the first type of questions (“Why
does it have this color/shape?”) were coded as teleological
or non-teleological; the second type of questions (“Is this
color/shape useful for something?”) were coded as useful or
other. All children's explanations were independently coded
by at least two researchers until absolute agreement was
achieved. All statistical tests were performed by SPPS 16.
To investigate whether children of different grades provided
different numbers of teleological explanations we first con-
ducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), to com-
pare the mean number of teleological explanations (for all
objects, both for color and shape) between the three groups.
Then we conducted a multivariate ANOVA to compare the
mean number of teleological explanations (both for color
and shape) separately for each item type shown to children
between the three groups—a three (grade: K, first grade,
second grade) by three (object type: organisms vs. artifacts
vs. non-living natural objects) ANOVA. Finally, we con-
ducted independent McNemar tests to compare children's
answers within each of the three groups. In particular, we
compared the teleological explanations for each item and for
each of its features (color/shape) for particular item pairs, as
well as teleological explanations with explanations for use-
fulness for each item.
Results2
“Why?” Questions and Teleological Explanations
Children's explanations for the first question (“Why does it
have this color/shape?”) were coded as teleological or non-
teleological. Children of all groups provided teleological
explanations for the color and shape of organisms' feet,
artifacts, and natural objects. Some children did not provide
any explanation, as they were told they could do. This was
done in order to make sure that children would express their
2 In this article, we present an overview and comparison of the results
for all grades (K-2) and we suggest a program for further research. The
results of our study of second grade students are presented in detail in
Kampourakis et al. 2011.
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intuitions freely and that they would not give an expla-
nation just because they had to. What is interesting is
that teleological explanations predominated among the
explanations given by children; however, in our analysis
we included the “do not know” answers in the group of
non-teleological explanations. The percentages of child-
ren's teleological explanations in each group are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows something like a shift from a non-selective
teleology to a more selective one. While many children of
all grades provided teleological explanations for the shape
of organisms' feet and for the shape of artifacts, there is a
decline in the number of children who did the same for the
respective colors from the pre-school towards the second-
grade group. In other words, while there is a clear pattern of
selective teleology for the shapes in the second-grade group,
there is no such pattern in the pre-school group, as they
provided many teleological explanations for the colors of
the items as well. To investigate if there is a statistically
significant difference in the number of teleological explan-
ations between the three groups, we conducted a one-way
ANOVA in order to compare the mean number of teleolog-
ical explanations in each group.
The one-way ANOVA found statistically significant dif-
ferences in the mean number of teleological explanations
(for all items, both for color and shape) between the three
groups, F(2, 180)03.175, p<0.044. The post hoc analysis
indicated a statistically significant difference between the
preschool and the second-grade groups (p<0.014) but not
between any of these two groups and the first-grade group.
This result suggests a gradual decrease of the mean number
of teleological explanations from preschool to second grade,
as shown in Fig. 1. This is an interesting finding and
suggests that children's grade (and consequently their age)
may affect the number of teleological explanations they
give: the older the children, the less the mean number of
teleological explanations they give.
Given this finding, it was important to investigate what
made this difference between the three groups. Did second-
grade children give teleological explanations in the same
way for all test items (organisms, artifacts, natural objects)
or for some of them more than others? To investigate this,
we conducted a three-by-three ANOVA (grade×item type)
both for the color and for the shape of the different items.
We found statistically significant differences in the mean
number of teleological explanations between the three
groups only for natural objects but not for organisms and
artifacts. The post hoc tests showed that there was a statis-
tically significant difference in the mean number of teleo-
logical explanations for the natural objects between the
preschool group and the second-grade group (p<0.001)
but not between any of these two groups and the first-
grade group. These findings suggest that the difference in
the mean number of teleological explanations for all items
between the preschool group and the second-grade group
found in the one-way ANOVA was actually due to the
difference in the mean number of teleological explanations
given for natural objects (Fig. 2). These results are very
important because what seems to decrease with age is the
number of children who provide teleological explanations
for natural objects. This stands as evidence for a shift from
non-selective to selective teleology.
In order to examine whether the items selected for the
study had a particular effect on children's teleological
explanations, we conducted McNemar tests for each pair
of items (feet of organisms, artifacts, and natural objects),
for each feature separately. For example, we investigated if
there was a statistically significant difference between the
number of teleological explanations that the children of each
group gave for the color of the scissors and the color of the
Table 1 Percentage (%) of
children who provided teleolog-
ical explanations





Duck feet Color 20.3 9.2 4.7
Shape 40.5 45.8 38.9
Scissors Color 17.6 5.2 9.4
Shape 63.5 56.2 52.4
Rock Color 18.9 8.5 4.0
Shape 20.3 11.8 5.4
Booby feet Color 16.2 13.1 8.7
Shape 32.4 38.6 33.6
Nutcracker Color 12.2 4.6 7.4
Shape 29.7 35.3 36.2
Stalagmite Color 16.2 5.2 4.7
Shape 13.5 10.5 4.7
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nutcracker (similarly we examined duck feet color vs. booby
feet color, duck feet shape vs. booby feet shape etc.). In all
comparisons, differences were statistically non-significant
except from one: There was a statistically significant differ-
ence (p<0.001) in all three groups between the number of
teleological explanations for the shape of the scissors and
the shape of the nutcracker. In this case, the item shown to
children had an effect; a possible explanation for this differ-
ence is that children were very familiar with the use of
scissors and as a result, many of them provided teleological
explanations for it. On the contrary, although many children
realized that the nutcracker is a tool, and that its shape must
have been intentionally designed for some use, this was not
as obvious as the use of the scissors was, and consequently
fewer children provided teleological explanations for the
nutcracker than for the scissors, which resulted in a statisti-
cally significant difference.
Teleological Explanations and Explanations for Usefulness
The second question of the questionnaire (“Is this feature
useful for something?”) was included in order to distinguish
between: a) those children who gave teleological explanations
because they had in mind a particular use of the features under
question and b) those who did so without a clear conception of
what the particular features were for. An interesting finding is
that although many children provided both teleological
explanations and explanations for usefulness for the shape of
particular items, there was not always a correlation between
these two types of explanations (Table 2).
Interestingly enough, there was a correlation between
teleological explanations and explanations for usefulness
for the shape of the nutcracker (with which most children
were unfamiliar), but not for the shape of the scissors (with
which most children were familiar). Given that one would
expect quite the contrary result, we conclude that perhaps
the concept of “usefulness” was not clear to all children. If
we focus on children's explanations for the shape of the feet
of the duck and the booby and for the shape of the scissors
and of the nutcracker, we find that there were differences
between the three groups. In particular, 16.3% of preschool
children provided both types of explanation for the shape of
the feet of the duck with a correlation between the two
types, but 28.4% of them provided both types of explanation
for the shape of the scissors without a correlation between
the two types. Given that in all other cases (shape of the feet
of the booby and shape of the nutcracker) less than 10% of
pre-school children provided both types of explanation, one
might question whether these children actually understood
the question about usefulness.
Fig. 1 Mean number of
teleological explanations for
each grade
Fig. 2 Mean numbers of
teleological explanations per
item type for each grade
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Similar (and perhaps even stranger) are the results for first-
grade children. On one hand, 31.43% of first-grade children
provided both types of explanation for the shape of the feet of
the duck and 26.1% of them provided both types of explana-
tion for the shape of the nutcracker, with a correlation between
the two types. On the other hand, 37.3% of them provided
both types of explanation for the shape of the scissors and
21.6% of them provided both types of explanation for the
shape of the feet of the booby, without a correlation between
the two types. In short, one can hardly accept that preschool
and first-grade children understood what usefulness means
and yet did not find the shape of the scissors useful. Only
second-grade children provided both types of explanation for
the shape of the feet of the duck and of the booby, as well as
for the shape of the scissors and the nutcracker with a corre-
lation between the two types in each of these cases. Some
representative examples of students' explanations from all
three grades are presented in Table 3.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Conceptual change in children's naive biology has been
studied over the years. Biological thinking emerges as an
autonomous domain of theorizing during childhood, al-
though a disagreement exists on how autonomous it is
(Carey 1985; Keil 1992; Springer 1999). This conceptual
change seems to consist of spontaneous conceptual change,
which takes place during development due to maturity and
independently of any instruction, and instruction-based con-
ceptual change, that is due to particular teaching interven-
tions that aim at promoting conceptual change. It is difficult
to distinguish between these two types of conceptual change
during elementary school, and whatever is happening is
probably the outcome of both maturity and schooling (Ina-
gaki and Hatano 2002, p.153–154). However, in the case of
intuitive teleology such a distinction may be possible, not
only because elementary instruction does not explicitly
Table 2 Percentage (%) of
children who provided both
teleological explanations and
explanations for usefulness
aIndicates that there was no sta-
tistically significant difference




Percentage (%) of children who
provided both teleological explanations
and explanations for usefulness
Pre-school First-grade Second-grade
(Ν074) (N0153) (Ν0149)
Duck feet Color 2,7a 5.8 1.3a
Shape 16.3a 31.4a 17.4a
Scissors Color 1.4a 0.7a 0.7a
Shape 28.4 37.3 29.5a
Rock Color 5.4 3.3a 2.7a
Shape 4.1 3.9a 1.3a
Booby feet Color 4.1a 5.3a 4.0a
Shape 8.1 21.6 18.1a
Nutcracker Color 2.7 2.6a 1.3a
Shape 6.8a 26.1a 22.2a
Stalagmite Color 5.4a 1.3a 1.3a
Shape 1.4a 7.2a 2.0a
Table 3 Examples of students'
teleological explanations Teleological explanations Explanations for usefulness
Duck feet Color In order to swim fast For concealment
Shape In order to swim In order to swim well
Scissors Color In order to show that it is sharp In order to cut things
Shape In order to cut Because humans like it that way
Rock Color So that lizards can conceal themselves In order to look nice
Shape So that humans can sit on it In order to look heavy
Booby feet Color In order to be indistinguishable in the water So that its feet are more beautiful
Shape In order to swim In order to swim well
Nutcracker Color In order to look nicer In order to be different
Shape In order to break nuts So that people break things
Stalagmite Color In order to be beautiful Because it looks nice
Shape In order to look nice So that the cave will look nicer
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address children's teleological intuitions and preconcep-
tions, but also because children are often implicitly driven
to an enhancement of these intuitions. For example, many
popular wildlife and nature programs seem to present evo-
lution in teleological terms, because they often present
organisms as perfectly designed in order to survive
(Aldridge and Dingwall 2003). Consequently, children are
not expected to undergo any spontaneous conceptual change
from teleological to non-teleological intuitions, as even
adults tend to intuitively provide teleological explanations
as well (e.g., Kelemen and Rosset 2009).
Our results indicate a conceptual shift from non-selective
to selective teleology during the ages of five to seven years
old. Of course, these results are not conclusive; a longitudi-
nal study would be required to confirm such a shift. Overall,
it seems that pre-school children apply teleology in a non-
selective manner. This does not only have to do with the
item type (organism, artifact, or natural object), but also
with the particular feature explained (color or shape). On
one hand, pre-school children provided teleological explan-
ations for all item types (though more for organisms and
artifacts), both for the color and for the shape (though more
for the shape). On the other hand, second-grade children
provided less teleological explanations, mostly for organ-
isms and artifacts and mostly for the shape. The number of
teleological explanations of the first-grade children was
intermediate between those of the pre-school and the
second-grade group children. These results suggest that
there may be a shift in how selectively teleological explan-
ations are applied during the ages five to seven years old.
The results of our study suggest that both Keil and
Kelemen could have made correct conclusions for particu-
lar ages, if Kelemen's studies had mostly involved pre-
school children (four to five years old) exhibiting a less
selective teleology, and if Keil's studies had mostly in-
volved older children (six to seven years old) exhibiting a
selective teleology. However, this was not the case; both
researchers included children of various ages in their stud-
ies. In what follows, we propose a research program that
might contribute to a better understanding of children's
teleological intuitions and of how these might change
during development. The proposed research program has
the following objectives: (1) to document students' teleo-
logical explanations and analyze the preconceptions on
which they are based, (2) to study whether these precon-
ceptions and the intuitions that generate them change dur-
ing the normal course of development, and (3) to
investigate whether particular interventions can challenge
these preconceptions and promote conceptual change.
No longitudinal study has ever been performed in order
to study children's teleological explanations. Thus, a devel-
opmental view can so far only be inferred by accumulating
the conclusions of independent bodies of research (e.g.,
Evans 2008). In order to provide an in-depth analysis of
elementary students' teleological intuitions from a develop-
mental perspective, we suggest that a four-year longitudinal
study is necessary (kindergarten to grade three; grade one to
grade four; grade two to grade five; grade three to grade six).
A proposed research design is summarized in Table 4. All
tests (pre-tests, intermediate tests, post-tests) should be per-
formed with semi-structured interviews.
As already discussed above, studies with preschool and
elementary children have shown that they tend to provide
teleological explanations for the features of organisms and
artifacts, and in some cases of natural objects, from a very
early age (three to four years old). Two distinct bodies of
research, by Keil and Kelemen, have led to different results
and conclusions about children's teleological intuitions. The
first aim of the proposed research is to clarify whether teleol-
ogy is applied selectively for organisms and artifacts, or if it is
generally applied to (non-living) natural objects as well. We
anticipate that the pre-tests which will be performed in year
one of the proposed study will provide evidence in support of
one of the two competing theories about the type of children's
teleological intuitions (selective or non-selective). For this
purpose, all pre-tests will include two types of questions that
will explicitly ask students why some organisms, artifacts, and
natural objects have particular features, whether these features
serve some function or role and how these features have come
into existence. As shown in Table 4, from year three onwards,
all pre-tests performed at the beginning of each school year
will also serve as retention tests for the interventions per-
formed the year before. The main two types of questions are
similar to those used in the study reported in this article. These
questions will have the form “Why does it have this feature?”
and “Is this feature useful for something?” As already
explained above, a student who would provide an “In order
to” explanation to a “Why?” question and then would describe
why the respective feature was useful, would have expressed
his teleological intuitions both implicitly and explicitly.
We follow White and Arzi in defining a longitudinal
study as “… one in which two or more measures or obser-
vations of a comparable form are made of the same individ-
uals or entities over a period of at least one year” (2005,
p.138). Such studies have the advantage that a particular
group of students can be studied over long periods of time.
Longitudinal studies are difficult to conduct, however, con-
trary to short-term studies, they can uncover how conceptual
development related to learning and understanding science
occurs. Actual learning takes time, and its outcomes may
not be evident in an immediate post-test. Consequently, a
longitudinal study that allows the comparison of the same
students at various ages may provide a detailed and accurate
account of the various factors that affect learning (White and
Arzi 2005). Of course, development involves multivariate
changes that may not be easy to assess (Ferrer and McArdle
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2010), but nevertheless this is the only way to understand
how intuitions and biases develop.
For the proposed study, we suggest a true experimental
design, according to Campbell and Stanley (1963). Students
of each grade will be randomly divided into classes. Ap-
proximately 1/3 of them should be the experimental group
and approximately 2/3 of them should be the control group.
The latter will undergo the “normal” conceptual develop-
ment, i.e., the development that would take place without
any particular teaching intervention that would address stu-
dents' teleological intuitions. Thus, the study of the explan-
ations given by students of the control group over the course
of four years would allow documentation of whether any
particular conceptual shifts related to teleology take place
during the elementary years. This would provide an outline
of the “normal” conceptual development–related to teleolo-
gy–to which the experimental group will be compared. In
this way, the effectiveness of teaching interventions that
address teleological intuitions can be properly assessed.
Evans (2008) has concluded that a conceptual shift takes
place around eight years old as five to seven year olds
provide different explanations for the origin of species com-
pared to eight to ten year olds. This shift is expected to take
place in grade three, and the proposed research design will
allow the longitudinal study of four consecutive “grade
three” groups of students from year two to year five. More-
over, the particular research design will probably allow
documentation of whether the particular conceptual shift
takes place earlier (in grade two) or later (in grade four).
Of course, we anticipate that by performing a pre-test, an
intermediate test after the first teaching intervention, and a
post-test after the second teaching intervention (see Table 2)
it will be possible to document any conceptual shift taking
place in any of the grades one to five. Another advantage of
the proposed research design, besides the fact that it allows
the longitudinal study of four groups for four years that is
expected to provide a thorough understanding of the con-
ceptual development related to teleology, is that it also
allows comparisons between different groups of students
of the same age. Thus, it would be possible to compare
two groups of kindergarten students (years one and two),
three groups of grade one students (years one to three), four
groups of grade two students (years one to four), four groups
of grade three students (years two to five), three groups of
grade four students (years three to five), and two groups of
grade five students (years four to five) (see Table 4). By
doing this, it would be possible to know which of the
concepts and conceptual shifts documented are representa-
tive of students of each age, and consequently characteristic
of each age, and which are simply documented in particular
groups of students. In short, by studying longitudinally four
groups of students for four years, a large number of students
of each grade would have been studied, and this would
provide an outline of conceptual development based on a
large sample.
One important issue is where such a study may be con-
ducted. White and Arzi (2005) note that random selection is
rarely possible in educational research, and that usually
researchers have to work with whomever they can get.
Students should be allocated to classes randomly in order
to have balanced groups. Moreover, a longitudinal study
requires commitment from the subjects of the research for
a long period. Thus, a large group of students is required so
that even if some students eventually leave—what Campbell
and Stanley (1963) have termed selective mortality—there
will be no serious problem for the study. The existence of
the control group will help deal with two other problems
recognized by Campbell and Stanley as affecting the valid-
ity of a study: history and maturation. The term history
refers to anything that happens alongside the intervention
that might affect the outcome of a study–like a documentary
film or a visit to the museum. The term maturation refers to
the improvement in students' performance that takes place
not because of the intervention but just because they grew
up. By performing the same test to both an experimental and
a control group simultaneously, we expect to eliminate the
Table 4 A summary of the research design
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Pre-K PRT
K PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
Grade 1 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
Grade 2 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
Grade 3 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2-PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT-I2––PST
Grade 4 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
Grade 5 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
Grade 6 PRT–PI PRT–I1–IT–I2–PST
PRT pre-test, also serves as retention test for the previous grade, IT intermediate test, PST post-test, PI pilot intervention, I1 teaching intervention
after the pre-test, I2 teaching intervention after the intermediate test and before the post-test
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foregoing factors that might affect the validity of the
conclusions.
The teaching interventions that will be performed in the
various grades should aim at helping students realize that
their teleological explanations do not work in nature. To
achieve this, there are two main prerequisites: (1) the aban-
donment of teleological language and its elimination from
any educational material and (2) the proper understanding
that organisms are neither perfect, nor designed. If these are
done consistently and repeatedly in elementary science in-
struction, students might realize the error of their initial
teleological explanations about organisms are wrong. The
abandonment of teleological language during biology in-
struction in elementary school is a first crucial step. Even
in biology textbooks one can find expressions like “Birds
have wings for flying.” And if a teacher asked “Why do
birds have wings?” the most probable answer students
would give would be “for flying.” We suggest that elemen-
tary students can be brought to conflict situations which
might help them realize that there are no simple answers to
such questions. For example, when students reply that wings
are for flying, the teacher could argue that wings are also for
swimming, as penguins use them in order to swim and not to
fly. The teacher could also remind students that ostriches
neither fly nor swim and still possess wings. Such examples
might drive students to reconsider their own ideas. It is
important for teachers to make their students understand
that a “Why?” question differs significantly from a “What
for?” question. The “What for?” question presupposes that a
purpose exists and thus the question requires a teleological
explanation. The “Why?” question is free from this assump-
tion, although it can be given a teleological explanation as
well. Hence, teachers should not tell their students that
“Birds have wings for flying” but that “Birds fly because
they have wings.” Airplanes have wings for flying; but
contrary to birds, airplanes are artifacts intentionally
designed for this purpose.
A second crucial step would be to help elementary stu-
dents understand that organisms often lack features which
are necessary for their survival. Thus, while one could claim
that whales have their hydrodynamic shapes in order to
swim fast in the sea, he could not explain why they do not
also have gills which unquestionably are useful for under-
water breathing. It is more appropriate to say that “Whales
swim fast in the sea because they have a hydrodynamic
shape.” But it is also the case that whales have to swim up
to the surface in order to breathe and that “Whales do not
have gills in order to be able to swim underwater” as many
species that live in the sea do. It is important that students
realize that in many cases and aspects organisms are not
perfect. Biology instruction should not only focus on useful
features but also on useless or even disadvantageous ones.
These reflect the evolutionary past of the various species;
and new species emerge from natural processes of change.
New species evolve from preexisting ones and are not
formed anew. Consequently, they preserve features of their
ancestors, no matter if these are useful or not. Evolutionary
history is important for understanding the origin of features
(Kampourakis 2011).
In Table 5, we present an overview of possible teaching
interventions. These interventions will involve only those
students belonging to the experimental group. It should be
noted that students should not only study examples of ani-
mals but also of plants. In addition, examples from astron-
omy (planets and solar system) would be useful as well
since students also tend to provide teleological explanations
about the properties of planetary bodies.
To summarize, the proposed research may make some
useful contributions. First, the teaching of evolution, a cru-
cial issue in science education, is addressed from a different
(developmental–psychological and not political) perspec-
tive, with a focus on a different age group than usual
(elementary rather than secondary or post-secondary). In
addition, elementary students' preconceptions (those related
to teleology in particular and not about evolution in general)
will be documented and will serve as the basis for the design
of specific teaching interventions that will aim to challenge
them. Possible conceptual shifts related to teleology that
elementary students undergo spontaneously in the normal
course of development may be documented during a study
of a kind that has never been performed in the past: four
groups of students of different Grades will be studied simul-
taneously and longitudinally for four years. The possibility
of promoting instruction-based conceptual change related to
Table 5 The teaching interven-
tions that will be performed in
each grade
Teaching intervention 1 Teaching intervention 2
K Organisms and artifacts Organisms and natural objects
Grade 1 Invertebrates Earth, Moon and Sun
Grade 2 Vertebrates (marine mammals) Plants
Grade 3 Vertebrates (terrestrial mammals) Earth and planets
Grade 4 Human body Plants
Grade 5 Animals Solar system
Grade 6 Adaptation and homology Plants
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teleology will also be investigated by studying an experi-
mental group and comparing it to the control group of the
same age, attending the same grades at the same time.
With the proposed research program, a new perspective will
be added to the evolution debates. People who oppose evolu-
tion may reject it not only because they feel that it is incom-
patible with their worldviews but also because they do not
understand it. The perceived conflict may not only be between
evolution and religious views but also between evolution and
their teleological view of nature. The proposed research
programme may also provide a framework for challenging
children's teleological intuitions during elementary school.
This might provide fertile ground for evolution instruction in
secondary and post-secondary settings, but it will not be in-
vestigated in the proposed research project. However, if it were
shown that children's teleological intuitions can be effectively
challenged at some particular age in their conceptual develop-
ment, policy makers and curriculum developers should recon-
sider how evolution is currently taught in schools.
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